Philippine Market Makers Face a Viability Test: Thin Product Coverage and Spread Economics

Philippine Market Makers Face a Viability Test: Thin Product Coverage and Spread Economics

A Framework That Starts Small

Market participants received the Philippine Stock Exchange’s proposed market-making framework with approval in June 2026, but the enthusiasm came with a qualification that matters for anyone expecting an immediate liquidity transformation. China Bank Capital Corp. managing director Juan Paolo E. Colet noted that the framework offers clear and reasonable rules on accreditation, operation, and regulation, yet its near-term impact is likely to be limited because only one exchange-traded fund and no Global Philippine Depositary Receipts were listed on the PSE at the time.

That observation cuts to the core of the reform’s sequencing problem. A well-designed rulebook applied to a narrow product set produces narrow results. Colet described the framework as laying the groundwork for broader initiatives that could eventually cover actively traded securities, but the immediate liquidity effect remains constrained by what is actually eligible for market making.

The Spread-to-Volatility Squeeze

Globalinks Securities and Stocks head of sales trading Toby Allan C. Arce identified the variable that will determine whether the framework attracts serious participation: the relationship between spread limits and inventory risk. If spread limits are set too tightly relative to volatility, market makers may find the activity economically unattractive and decline to participate aggressively.

This is not a hypothetical concern. Market making is a balance-sheet business. The provider holds inventory to quote both sides, and the spread must compensate for adverse price moves during the holding period. In a market with concentrated ownership, episodic volatility, and limited hedging tools, the required compensation can exceed what a tightly regulated spread allows. The framework’s obligations—maximum bid-ask spreads, minimum quote sizes, and required presence times—are simultaneously its liquidity mechanism and its economic constraint.

Structural Weaknesses Beyond the Rulebook

Arce also noted that the proposal alone is unlikely to resolve broader issues such as low retail investor participation and limited institutional depth. This distinction is important. Market making addresses a microstructure problem—the cost and availability of immediate execution—but it does not create end-investor demand. A market maker can narrow the spread between buyers and sellers, but it cannot manufacture the buyers and sellers themselves.

The risk is that the framework improves the mechanics of trading without expanding the base of participants who trade. If that happens, the measurable gains in spread and quote presence may coexist with unchanged turnover concentration, producing a technically successful reform with a modest aggregate liquidity effect.

The Government Counterparty Question

A separate line of critique raises the possibility that private-sector participation alone may be insufficient in a depressed market environment. The argument is that market makers taking on inventory risk in thinly traded securities may require a government financial institution or pension fund to serve as a counterparty on the buy and sell side, or as a provider of securities, particularly where trading volume is structurally low.

That proposal moves the debate beyond rule design into market structure. If the private economics of market making do not close without an official backstop, the framework’s success depends on a policy commitment that has not yet been made. The PSE’s framework is a necessary first step, but the viability test will be decided by whether accredited firms can quote continuously at regulated spreads and still earn a return that justifies the inventory they must carry.

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